AUCTIONOMICS

Paul Milgrom, co-founder and chairman of the Board of Directors

Author of "Putting Auction Theory to Work," published by Cambridge University Press in 2004.

"Paul Milgrom has combined fundamental work in economic theory and, in particular, the theory of auctions, with extensive practical participation in the auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. This book is a brilliant synthesis of his own and others' contributions to the field. The impact of practical problems on the need for theory is thoroughly exemplified. The exposition of the theory has that complete ease only achievable through complete mastery and intense work." Kenneth Arrow, Nobel Laureate, Stanford University

A decade ago, Milgrom’s expanded his role from that of an academic game theorist when he became the main architect of the Federal Communications Commission’s original US spectrum auction design; it was his “activity rule” that made feasible the implementation of the “simultaneous multiple round” (SMR) auction. Milgrom's role in creating this design is celebrated in accounts by the National Science Foundation (“America's Investment in the Future”), which identifies it as one of the main practical contributions of 20th century research in micro-economic theory, and by the prestigious National Academy of Sciences (“Beyond Discovery”). The SMR design has been copied and adapted worldwide for auctions of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of radio spectrum, electricity, natural gas, etc. 

The next of Milgrom's major innovations was the “core-selecting package auction,” developed with collaborator Professor Bob Day and incorporated in 2007 into the U.K.’s spectrum auction mechanism. In 2008, the UK further revised their auction rules to include the patent-pending "revealed preference activity rule," co-invented by Milgrom and his collaborator Professor Lawrence Ausubel. 

Most recently, Milgrom has invented the “Milgrom assignment auction,” the proprietary design that makes Auctionomics unique. Like Milgrom’s original SMR mechanism, this design can address especially complex situations involving complementarity, but the Milgrom assignment auction runs instantaneously. Compared to the original SMR auction, which require many hours, days, or weeks, the new design reduces transaction costs and increases precision in setting prices. Most exciting, perhaps, is the design’s potential for entirely new applications. It can be adapted into a non-price bidding mechanism to place students efficiently and fairly into college courses, or to reallocate airline slots in the event of bad weather at a crowed airport.

And Milgrom’s theoretical approach is tempered by wide consulting experience on high- profile auction designs. He has advised regulators in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, and Mexico, on the implementation and improvement of the original SMR design, and is currently engaged by the US Treasury to advise on auctions of mortgage-backed securities. At Google, Milgrom advised CEO Eric Schmidt and co-founder Sergey Brin on the design of their IPO. At Yahoo!, he advised on the design of markets to sell on-line advertising, and at Microsoft Networks on auctions related to the placement of search advertising.

Milgrom has also had notable success leading teams of consultants to advise bidders in major auctions, including the team that guided Comcast and its consortium SpectrumCo, in US Auction 66, to the most exceptional performance in US-spectrum-auction history. SpectrumCo saved nearly $1.2 billion on its spectrum license purchases based on the prices paid by other large bidders - such as T-Mobile and Verizon - for comparable spectrum acquired at the same time in the same auction. SpectrumCo's tactics included a $750 million jump-bid - the largest in the history of US spectrum auctions and a move that prompted the FCC to change the auction rules. His unorthodox strategy will be described in more detail in the forthcoming article "Winning Play in a Spectrum Auction."

Steve Goldband, co-founder and Member of the Board of Directors

Dr. Goldband has been a technology entrepreneur, worked in various management, marketing and engineering roles, and served on a university faculty. He was most recently Director of Private Sector Initiatives at the Stanford University Center on Longevity, where he worked across disciplines to help commercialize faculty innovations. He was CEO and founder of smokeClinic, a venture that brought together state-of-the art behavior therapy and internet technologies to deliver a scalable, low-cost smoking-cessation program as effective as face-to-face counseling. Prior to that, he co-founded FullCircle Systems, which developed “push” software in the early days of the web. Both start-ups were subsequently acquired. Goldband has managed teams of engineers at Sun Microsystems, Apple Computer, IBM, and Visioneer in the areas of imaging, developer tools, and optimizing compiler engineering. He was on the psychology faculty at University of Western Ontario, where he taught and studied the psychophysiology of stress and predisposition to coronary heart disease. He received a B.A. from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in Psychology from The University of Buffalo. Goldband is an avid photographer specializing in urban landscapes.

Silvia Console Battilana, co-founder and member of the Board of Directors

Dr. Console Battilana is a young entrepreneur and economist specializing in game theory and interest groups. She holds a Ph.D. from the Stanford Economics department and has taught graduate students as a Visiting Professor at Bocconi University, as well as speaking at major US universities such as Harvard, Caltech and Berkeley, as well as universities in Turkey, China, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Italy, Messico and Spain. Her co-authors include Harvard Professor Kenneth Shepsle and Stanford Professor Douglas Bernheim, and her entrepreneurial experience began during graduate school, when she successfully started a C-corporation in the higher education industry.  Silvia is also very active in the Silicon Valley, organizing networking events that bring together experienced entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, engineers, and start-up rookies.

Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz, affiliate

Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz is the Theodore J. Kreps Professor of Economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. His research is in the field of microeconomics. His recent publications include papers on auction theory, bargaining, repeated games, and collusion in markets.

Skrzypacz received his Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in Economics from the University of Rochester and an M.A. degree in Economics from the Warsaw School of Economics. He is currently an associate editor for the American Economic Review, the Rand Journal of Economics and the Theoretical Economics journal. He has received a Stanford GSB PhD Distinguished Service Award and has advised over a dozen of Ph.D. dissertations.

In addition to his academic research, Skrzypacz consults clients on auction strategy and competition issues. In the recent years Skrzypacz has advised bidders in wireless spectrum auctions in U.S., Canada and Sweden. He also advised internet companies on design and competition in online auctions and communication companies on regulation issues. He is also a member of advisory board of SRECTrade ? an auction platform for renewable energy certificates.

Greg Rosston, affiliate

Rosston is Deputy Director, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Greg Rosston is a Research Fellow at SIEPR and Visiting Lecturer in Economics at Stanford University. His research has focused on industrial organization, antitrust and regulation. He has written numerous articles on competition in local telecommunications, implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, auctions and spectrum policy.

He has also co-edited two books, including Interconnection and the Internet: Selected Papers from the 1996 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference.

At Stanford, he has taught Regulation and Antitrust in the economics department and a seminar for seniors in the Public Policy program. Prior to joining Stanford University, Dr. Rosston served as Deputy Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission. At the FCC, he helped to implement the Telecommunications Act. In this work, he helped to design and write the rules the Commission adopted as a framework to encourage efficient competition in telecommunications markets. He also helped with the design and implementation of the FCC's spectrum auctions.

Dr. Rosston received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University and his A.B. in Economics with Honors from the University of California, Berkeley.

David Salant, affiliate

Dr. Salant is a leading expert on auctions and game theory, currently serving as a professor at the Toulouse School of Economics, an adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Business School, and a research professor at Clemson University's College of Engineering. Dr. Salant’s work on auction design and bid strategy in the energy sector has included the design and management of the initial NJ BGS procurement auction, as well as advising on auction designs for gas capacity in Austria, energy procurement in California, Illinois, Italy and Montana, the sale of energy entitlements in Alberta and Texas, and capacity markets in California and New York, and providing bid-strategy advice and conducting simulations for the PDVSA 3rd round of oil leases in Venezuela and for sales of energy entitlements in Alberta and Texas.

Dr. Salant's experience advising firms on bid strategy in data-spectrum auctions includes work for Vodafone, Verizon Wireless, Leap Wireless International, QUALCOMM, Ericsson, Taiwan Cellular, Telia, KPN, Orange, T-Mobile, Lucent and others in auctions in Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the US. Dr. Salant has also advised government agencies in numerous countries on the design and implementation of spectrum auctions and allocation procedures, including advising the US Federal Communications Commission, Industry Canada, the Australian ACA, Mexico's Cofetel, UK's OFCOM, the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India, and the Italian Ministry of Communications.

Dr. Salant’s numerous publications in the areas of auction design and regulation include the guest editorship of two special issues of Journal of Regulatory Economics on the topic of “Auctions and Regulation,” and his dozens of seminar presentations at universities, conferences, and industry forums include lectures at the International Telecommunications Society, the meetings of the Econometric Society in Latin America, and the Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition. Dr. Salant has developed a course on “Auction Design, Implementation and Management,” which he teaches at the Toulouse School of Economics.