Client Scenarios
Auction to Sell (Forward Auction)
Auctionomics’ proprietary software offers unprecedented advantages to companies and governments seeking the best buyers for their goods, services, or portfolio. Our software finds exact market-clearing prices and then selects the allocation of lots among bidders that maximizes the auctioneer’s profit. The auctioneer is guaranteed a) that prices are set by competition among buyers, b) that the auctioneer will never sell below its minimum offers, and c) that the auctioneer will receive the mix of product sales that will maximize profit at market-clearing prices, whether this allocation involves multiple buyers or a single one. These guarantees hold even in cases of opaque prices, swaps, and auctions for multiple substitute-goods with delivery constraints. Auctionomics allows each bidder to specify a complete supply-function, including quantity-constraints on each bid and bid-group, as well as specifying swaps and selecting among substitute goods. Even if your buyers are located in every geographical region and time zone, we provide the solution: the clock auction finds market-clearing prices and quantities fast, and the assignment auction does so immediately, at the click of a button.
Auction to Buy (Reverse Auction)
Auctionomics offers the same unprecedented advantages not only to companies and governments wishing to sell, but also to those seeking to purchase goods, services, or a portfolio from the best vendors. The buyer is then the auctioneer: after finding exact market-clearing prices, our proprietary software selects the mix of purchases that maximizes the buyer’s value. The buyer is guaranteed a) never to buy above its maximum offers, and b) always to receive the mix of product sales that will maximize its profit at market-clearing prices, whether this allocation involves multiple vendors or a single one. These guarantees still hold even in cases of opaque prices, swaps, and auctions for multiple substitute-goods with delivery constraints. Auctionomics’ designs allow each bidder to specify a complete supply-function, including quantity-constraints on each bid and bid-group, as well as to specify swaps, select among substitute goods, and include shrinkage on each single product. Our reverse auctions also use clock- and assignment-auction technologies in order to find equilibrium values rapidly or immediately, facilitating the participation of bidders from every time zone and geographical region.
Exchange (Double Auction)
Auctionomics’ innovations in economic theory result in designs that offer unmatched value and performance to institutions running an exchange or seeking to build a new one. After finding exact market-clearing prices, our software selects the allocation with the highest total value differential, maximizing gain for all buyers and sellers. Auctionomics’ exchanges increase value not only for buyers and sellers, but also for the auctioneer: our designs increase the liquidity of markets by guaranteeing that every bidder receives its preferred allocation at market-clearing prices; when prices are opaque, they implement an incentive-compatible price-discovery mechanism; and our exchanges maximize the added-value-based transaction-fees received by the auctioneer by maximizing total value added for all bidders. And, like our auctions to buy or sell, Auctionomics’ exchanges can handle complex situations with multiple substitute-goods, and use clock- or assignment-auction technology in order to find equilibrium values rapidly or immediately, again obviating time-zone constraints, and facilitating the participation of bidders from all over the globe.
Auctionomics’ proprietary software offers unprecedented advantages to companies and governments seeking the best buyers for their goods, services, or portfolio. Our software finds exact market-clearing prices and then selects the allocation of lots among bidders that maximizes the auctioneer’s profit. The auctioneer is guaranteed a) that prices are set by competition among buyers, b) that the auctioneer will never sell below its minimum offers, and c) that the auctioneer will receive the mix of product sales that will maximize profit at market-clearing prices, whether this allocation involves multiple buyers or a single one. These guarantees hold even in cases of opaque prices, swaps, and auctions for multiple substitute-goods with delivery constraints. Auctionomics allows each bidder to specify a complete supply-function, including quantity-constraints on each bid and bid-group, as well as specifying swaps and selecting among substitute goods. Even if your buyers are located in every geographical region and time zone, we provide the solution: the clock auction finds market-clearing prices and quantities fast, and the assignment auction does so immediately, at the click of a button.
Auction to Buy (Reverse Auction)
Auctionomics offers the same unprecedented advantages not only to companies and governments wishing to sell, but also to those seeking to purchase goods, services, or a portfolio from the best vendors. The buyer is then the auctioneer: after finding exact market-clearing prices, our proprietary software selects the mix of purchases that maximizes the buyer’s value. The buyer is guaranteed a) never to buy above its maximum offers, and b) always to receive the mix of product sales that will maximize its profit at market-clearing prices, whether this allocation involves multiple vendors or a single one. These guarantees still hold even in cases of opaque prices, swaps, and auctions for multiple substitute-goods with delivery constraints. Auctionomics’ designs allow each bidder to specify a complete supply-function, including quantity-constraints on each bid and bid-group, as well as to specify swaps, select among substitute goods, and include shrinkage on each single product. Our reverse auctions also use clock- and assignment-auction technologies in order to find equilibrium values rapidly or immediately, facilitating the participation of bidders from every time zone and geographical region.
Exchange (Double Auction)
Auctionomics’ innovations in economic theory result in designs that offer unmatched value and performance to institutions running an exchange or seeking to build a new one. After finding exact market-clearing prices, our software selects the allocation with the highest total value differential, maximizing gain for all buyers and sellers. Auctionomics’ exchanges increase value not only for buyers and sellers, but also for the auctioneer: our designs increase the liquidity of markets by guaranteeing that every bidder receives its preferred allocation at market-clearing prices; when prices are opaque, they implement an incentive-compatible price-discovery mechanism; and our exchanges maximize the added-value-based transaction-fees received by the auctioneer by maximizing total value added for all bidders. And, like our auctions to buy or sell, Auctionomics’ exchanges can handle complex situations with multiple substitute-goods, and use clock- or assignment-auction technology in order to find equilibrium values rapidly or immediately, again obviating time-zone constraints, and facilitating the participation of bidders from all over the globe.